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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the possible effects of broader-based local government, especially extended 
associations, in Japanese local public finance. We mainly analyze scale effects in public long-term care 
insurance expenditure, with our results indicating a U shaped expenditure structure.  
We also show that expenditures associated with extended associations decrease more rapidly than 
ordinary municipal expenditures. These findings suggest that expenditure of appropriate population size 
extended associations larger than single municipality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, Japan has suffered from severe fiscal problems, particularly in local government. 
With the advance of decentralization, the role of the local government has become increasingly 
important, and there has been the active promotion of ‘municipal mergers’1 (shi-tyou-son-gappei) and 
‘broader-based local government’ (kouiki-gyousei) through extended association to strengthen local 
administration and achieve fiscal reconstruction. Through the municipal merger process known as 
Heisei-no-Daigapei, the number of municipalities in Japan decreased from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,820 in 
2006. At the same time, other municipalities have organized extended associations. There are, however, 
some municipalities that did not merged. In this case, implementing broader-based local government, 
municipality might be able to achieve appropriate and flexible fiscal management in local public service. 
Throughout this process, arguments over the ‘wider-area local government system’ (Dou-shu-sei)2 that 
seeks to divide Japan into small blocks will likely remain.  
Some studies have already analyzed local public finances in Japan. We briefly summarize their results 
as follows. Saito (1999), for instance, argued for the estimation of scale effects for each type of local 
government expenditure. One implication is that it may be better to consider broader-based local 
government than municipal mergers for some local public services. Akai and Takemoto (2008) also 
studied the efficient administration area for each type of expenditure in local government. They 
recommended the transfer to higher-level governments of some public services currently provided by 
local governments. However, while many studies concern municipal mergers and the wider-area local 
government system in Japan, few consider broader-based local government. For example, a number of 
municipalities in Japan currently organize an extended association for fire protection, garbage disposal 
services and public long-term care insurance (LTCI), with one justification for broader-based local 
government being the presence of scale effects. 
                                                     
1 Hirota (2007) studied the incentive for municipal mergers in local public finance using a multinomial and nested logit model. 
2 The wider-area local government system currently under discussion in Japan differs from the state and county system in the 
United States. Unfortunately, space does not permit discussion here. 
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In view of an aging society, public LTCI commenced in Japan in 2000: Germany has adopted a similar 
program for the diversification of various risks. Municipalities and extended associations manage this 
program throughout the country. The municipality sets service content and premiums based on the 
situation in each area. The main difference between Japan and Germany is the fiscal burden of LTCI. 
While German insurers only levy insurance premiums from their residents, Japanese insurers receive 
both insurance premiums and transfers from the general account. If the fiscal condition of Japanese 
insurers then worsens, the general accounts of local government must then support the long-term care 
insurer through their own tax revenues. Thus, it is important to investigate the financing of LTCI in 
Japan. 
In recent years, several studies have been devoted to the study of the relationship between public 
LTCI and local public finance in Japan. For instance, Tajika and Yui (2004) argued that the subsidy 
caused moral hazard. Using data from 2001 and 2002, Yamauchi (2006) showed that public LTCI office 
expenditure decreased because of scale effects.3 In some studies, the empirical effects of a wider area of 
local government have been suggestive but tentative. Yamauchi (2006) concluded that the term for 
broader-based local government is insignificant. 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the possible effects of broader-based local government, 
including extended association, in Japanese local public finance. First, we analyze the scale effects of 
public LTCI expenditure. We extend the model in Yamauchi (2006) by introducing data from 2003 and 
2005. This is because Yamauchi (2006) only used data from the first two years following the 
introduction of public LTCI in 2000; on this basis, it would be difficult to determine the true effect of 
broader-based local government. Second, we compare ordinary municipalities and those resulting from 
municipal mergers and extended association (multi and single tasks) by adding dummy variables to the 
estimated equation. This is useful for pointing out fundamental differences in the system of local 
government. 
                                                     
3 Also, Yamauchi (2008) studied the incentive for broader-based local governance in public LTCI using a multinomial logit 
model. 
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Using estimated expenditure of a similar type as our principal independent variable, our results reveal 
the existence of fiscal policy interdependence. This is because in fiscal policy decisions, municipal 
expenditure may depend on expenditures in similar municipalities (see, for example, Case et al. (1993) 
and Revelli (2005)). Therefore, this estimation employs a financial index table of organizations and 
municipalities classified by similar types. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses municipal mergers and 
broader-based local government. Section 3 presents the empirical method using cost functions and 
describes the data set. Section 4 provides the results of the estimation and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Municipal Mergers and Broader-Based Local Government 
 
The previous section discussed the system of local government in Japan. Generally, the main reason 
for promoting wider-area government is expectations of fiscal sustainability through an expansion in 
scale. The focus of this paper is whether differences in local government influence local public 
expenditure. 
To start with, we explain the system of wider-area government in Japan. This system draws on two 
patterns: municipal mergers and broader-based local government.4 The key difference is whether the 
municipality merges with other municipalities or cooperates with existing municipalities in providing 
some local public service. The principal objective of municipal mergers is to achieve a strengthening of 
administration and an improvement in its fiscal condition. In local public finance, mergers can be used 
as a means of reducing expenditure because of the presence of economies of scale in total expenditure. 
However, we should note that the merger of existing municipalities could also lead to inefficient 
expenditures because of adjustment costs. 
                                                     
4 For a discussion of broader-based local government, see Yamauchi (2008) and the MIAC website at 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/kouiki/kouiki.html. 
 3 
Broader-based local government may be divided into two types: multitask extended association 
(Kouiki-rengo) and single task extended association (Ichibu-jimu-kumiai). The main difference is 
whether a multiple or single service is provided. Further, multitask extended association involves a 
stronger level of authority than single task extended association. For example, local government rules 
may need changing in municipalities of extended association and the setting up of a conference 
comprising local government representatives. As a result, differences among authorities influence 
expenditure in extended associations. 
Table 1 show the numbers of municipalities in multitask extended association in 2003. On average, 
there are eight municipalities in each multitask extended association. Table 2 also shows the number of 
municipalities in single task extended association in 2003. There are about six municipalities on average 
in each single task extended association. The smallest number in any municipality for both forms of 
extended association is three. The highest number in a single task extended association is 17 in 
Shimabara, though in the Fukuoka multitask extended association there are 71 municipalities.5 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Empirical Model 
 
When considering the provision of Japanese public LTCI, local public government aims to minimize 
costs while achieving some certain level of public service. Following Yamauchi (2006), the regression 
equation is: 
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where i  refers to municipality i , β  represents the coefficients of the independent variables, and iε  is 
                                                     
5 There are 96 in municipality in Fukuoka prefecture. It is to be notice that this particular municipality accounts for 76% of all 
municipalities in the Fukuoka prefecture.   
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an error term composed of identically independent random variables with a normal distribution. The 
variable  is per capita office expenditures on public LTCI between 2003 and 2005. There are two 
reasons for specifying office expenditure. First, the primary purpose of this study is to explain scale 
effects in broader-based local government. Administrative capacity of extended association can be 
strengthened by interaction with other municipalities, allowing joint work of handling of public LTCI. 
iE
Second, temporary expenditure not observed in our data set, such as construction costs, increases total 
expenditure. The variable  is population (in logs) and  is the average wage of public 
officers (in logs). As an environmental factor, the level of population controls for the scale effects in 
local government expenditure. A U shape arises in equation (1) when  is negative and  is positive; 
this captures the increasing effect of population on office expenditures. 
ipopln iwln
1βˆ 2βˆ
All insured persons aged over 40 years are included in the public LTCI program. These comprise two 
categories. The first category includes persons aged 65 years or over. The second category includes 
those aged between 40 and 65 years.  
ioverr 40_  represents the ratio of citizens aged 40 and over to the entire population in i th 
municipality. The ratio of citizens of over 65 to citizens aged over 40 represents aging population in 
LTCI.  is the rate of the number of LTCI payments to aged over 65; this variable 
shows the density of payments.  represents the ratio of transfer from the upper government 
to total revenue in municipality i . When municipalities supply public LTCI, their revenues include not 
only the premiums they collect but also subsidies from upper level governments. There is a possibility 
that transfers increase LTCI expenditure. 
itsLTCIpaymenr _
itransferr _
The variable  represents the number of municipalities included in an extended association. 
An increase in the number of members requires greater expenditure.  is a dummy variable indicating 
the difference in intercept of ordinary municipalities and those in an extended association. Ordinary 
municipalities are the reference group.  is a dummy variable taking a value of one if the 
municipality has merged and zero otherwise. Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and cross-sectional municipal level data. The extended association data used in this estimation is 
igroup
iD
iMD
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comparable with the municipal data. We also estimate the model by adding an interaction term between 
municipalities and extended associations. We employ heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
estimating the equations.6 
 
3.2 Data 
 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the data used.7 The fiscal data on public LTCI is mainly 
derived from the Kaigo Hoken Tokubetsu Kaikei (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare), while the data 
on the Japanese municipalities is from the Shi Tyo Son Betsu Kessan Jyokyo Shirabe (Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications, MIAC). The number of observations (including extended 
associations and municipalities) vary during the sample period with 2,632 in 2003, 2,183 in 2004, and 
1,633 in 2005.8 There are also some missing values on wages and the number of local officers in the 
extended associations. The number of wage and local officers of extended association represented it in 
the mean value of the relevant municipalities. The extended association (E.A.) dummy is made by three 
patterns. First, E.A.dummy=1 when the municipality set up extended association, otherwise zero. 
Second, E.A.dummy different multitask E.A. from single task E.A. The expenditure structure of these 
two types of extended association differ across the three groups. Third, we estimate the model by adding 
an interaction term. In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the number of multitask and single task extended 
associations is 35, 30, and 26 and 29, 21, and 13, respectively. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the 
characteristics of the extended association data. 
Figure 1 provides a scatter diagram of per capita office expenditure and logged population in 2003. 
This figure literally implies that at low values of logged population, one additional logged population 
has a negative effect on per capita office expenditure. At some point, the effect becomes positive, and 
                                                     
6  See Wooldridge (2005) 
7 MIAC Website (Kouiki Gyosei) http://www.soumu.go.jp/kouiki/pdf/rengo_H20.pdf 
MIAC Website (Gapei Soudan Corner) http://www.soumu.go.jp/gapei/ 
MHLW Website (Kaigo Hoken Jigyo Hokoku) http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/kouhyo/indexk-kousei.html#kou7 
8 We exclude isolated islands and the 23 wards in Tokyo from our sample because their services differ from those of typical 
Japanese municipalities. 
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the U shape means that per capita office expenditure with respect to logged population is increasing as 
logged population increases. 
 
3.3 Municipal Organizations by Type 
 
We also consider the fiscal condition of public LTCI on municipalities. We use the financial index 
table of organizations and municipalities classified by similar types compiled by the MIAC. This index 
compares each municipality’s own fiscal condition with fiscal conditions in other municipalities. With 
the aim of providing comparison data, the MIAC has created a category of municipalities classified by 
similar types (hereafter abbreviated as “similar type”). Each category of municipal organizations by 
similar type employs criteria that measure population and the ratio of secondary and tertiary industry in 
cities (except for ordinance-designated cities) and towns and villages. Table 6 provides the matrix of the 
categories of similar types and the number of municipalities in each type.  
Using this index, we can compare the expenditure of municipality and extended association. The 
expenditure of a municipality might be “similar” to the expenditure of another municipality in the same 
similar type. For the purposes of comparison of expenditure of each municipality with municipality with 
similar type,   the value of estimated expenditure is calculated using the following steps:  is each 
municipality’s real office expenditure.  represents the estimated office expenditure of a similar 
type.  
iE
iE
~
In the ordinary municipal case, for example, we consider the case of Iizuka city which belong to type 
is III–5. There are 37 municipalities in this type (see Table 7). The estimated expenditure of Iizuka city 
is calculated using the following equation, 
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Equation (2) represents estimated expenditure with a similar type. The numerator of equation (2) is 
sum of expenditure with type III-5 except for Iizuka city. The denominator of equation is the number of 
municipalities in type III-5 except for Iizuka city. We can use this calculating formula in other 
municipalities. Thus, the general formulation is as follows: 
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where 
imunE ,
~  represents the i th municipality and set of municipalities  whose type is the same as . typeS i
Now consider the extended association. For example, the Hidaka multitask extended association 
comprises three towns (Niikappu, Shizunai, and Mitsuishi). The population of Niikappu is 6,204 
persons. The secondary industry ratio is 15.8%. The tertiary industry ratio is 41.2%. A similar type of 
town to Niikappu is classified II-0. Likewise, the respective population and secondary and tertiary 
industry ratios are 23,125 persons, 19.9%, and 62.6% in Shizunai and 5,313 persons, 18.3%, and 39.3% 
in Mitsuishi. Therefore, town types VI-2 and I-0 (Table 6) classify Shizunai and Mitsuishi, respectively. 
In the case of the Hidaka extended association (there are 32 municipalities in type II-0, 12 in type 
VI-2, and 52 in type I-0, see Table 7), our estimated expenditure equation takes the form: 
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Each municipal and extended association faces estimated expenditure of a similar type: 
 
∑
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 Similarly, 
kEAE ,
~  in equation (5) represents the k th extended association and set  represents a 
similar type of extended association. 
kEAS ,
 
1~
, <
=
>
kEA
i
E
E
. (6) 
 
Equation (6) represents the ratio of observed office expenditure to estimated expenditure. Figure 2 
compares the estimated expenditure of a similar type with actual office expenditure. As shown, this ratio 
is nearly one in ordinary municipalities, while the mean in multitask extended associations is 0.93 and 
1.04 in the single task extended associations.9 This suggests that multitask extended associations are 
able to provide broader-based local government at lower cost. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Scale Effects 
 
The empirical results are reported in Table 8.10 The regression estimate for the population term is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Because the coefficient on  is negative and the 
coefficient on the squared term is positive, this literally implies that at low values of logged population, 
an additional logged population has a negative effect on per capita office expenditure. At some point, the 
effect becomes positive, and the U shape means that per capita office expenditure with respect to logged 
ipopln
                                                     
9 The ratio of the Iga multitask extended association has the highest score of 2.19. 
10 Table 5 is for 2003. Detailed results for 2004 and 2005 are available upon request. 
 9 
population is increasing as logged population increases. In general, the population coefficients for each 
data set are almost identical. This finding is in agreement with the account in Yamauchi (2006). The 
demographic structures of the population aged over 40 years and over 65 years are significantly 
positive.11 The results show that the progress of aging society in the LTCI increases office expenditure, 
because of the ratio of over 65 is positive significant. The coefficient of transfer ratio, represented in all 
cases, is significant. Thus, an increase in transfer may pose moral hazard problems. The dummy variable 
for extended association is statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in column (1). In column 
(2), the single task dummy is positive and significant, but the dummy for multitask association is 
insignificant. However, the multitask dummy has a positive coefficient. 12  This needs further 
consideration. To interpret the coefficients on the dummy variables, we must remember that the 
reference group is municipalities. Comparing the dummy variable coefficients, the order is ordinary 
municipality < merged municipality < multitask extended association < single task extended 
association. 
We add an interaction term to extended association in columns (3) and (4). The interaction term of the 
population is statistically significant. The slope of the population of extended association decreases 
rapidly. Figure 3 shows the estimated population value by ordinary municipality and extended 
association. The scale effect of extended association is larger than that of ordinary municipality. In terms 
of cost efficiency, one way to decrease local government cost is through merger. However, if an 
appropriate population size is possible, extended association can also achieve a cost decrease. 
 
4.2 Fiscal Policy Interdependence: The Case of LTCI in Japan 
 
This section identifies public expenditure interdependence in public LTCI. If municipality i  has 
                                                     
11 In place of aged over 65 years, we included a variable for aged over 75 years. However, the empirical results remain 
unchanged. 
12 There is the possibility that the group variable influences estimation because the Fukuoka multitask extended association is 
composed of 71 municipalities. However, the estimation results did not change when we excluded Fukuoka from our 
sample. 
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interdependence with policy decisions in municipalities of a similar type, it may influence its 
expenditure. Our attempt at classification by similar type helps us better understand a spatially and 
temporally varying local government. Recent empirical models of fiscal policy interdependence have 
employed spatial econometrics methods (for example, Anselin (1988), Case et al. (1993), Revelli (2005), 
and Geys (2006)).13 
For estimation, we can write the linear specification as: 
 
iiii EXE ελββ +++= ~0 , (7) 
 
where 0β  is the constant term, and  are independent variables as in equation (1). In addition to these 
variables, the estimated expenditure with similar type 
iX
iE
~  is used.14 The parameter λ  is supposed to 
reveal that municipality  and municipalities classified by similar type have interdependence. Generally, 
the empirical model of spatial interdependence has two problems.
i
15  
First, estimating equation (7) with OLS may result in a biased coefficient estimate because the 
dependent variable, office expenditure, and estimated expenditure as an independent variable invoke 
simultaneity in the determination of fiscal policy. As a result, the estimation in this paper uses lagged 
estimated expenditure in 2001.16 Therefore, it deals with simultaneity by using lagged variables. 
Second, the estimated expenditure of a similar type correlates with the error term (spatial 
autocorrelation). This may also provide inconsistent estimators using OLS. Instead, the estimation 
should use instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) or maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation (see Anselin (1988)). However, a number of factors contribute to heteroskedasticity in 
addition to spatial autocorrelation when municipalities in Japan are considered. Unfortunately, it is 
                                                     
13  Sugawara and Kunisaki (2006) studied for fiscal competition among Japanese prefectures. 
14 
iE
~ of below value represents below the mean value of the similar type, which belongs. 
15 For further details of spatial econometrics methods, see Anselin (1988) and Revelli (2005). However, the fuller study of 
spatial interdependence lies outside the scope of this paper. 
16 The public LTCI program was introduced in Japan in 2000. However, data from 2001 is used because of problems with the 
postponement of insurance premiums in 2000. 
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difficult to make these specific. Therefore, equation (7) is estimated using heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors. 
The empirical findings are reported in Table 9.  are almost the same as in Table 8 excluding the 
municipal mergers dummy. The coefficients of  and  of below value of municipal i  are 
estimated to be positively significant at the 1% level. The results provide convincing evidence that 
expenditure in municipality i  contributes to expenditure of municipalities of a similar type. In other 
words, there is a possibility that municipality i  and municipalities of a similar type are interdependent 
in fiscal policy decisions on public LTCI. Consequently, expenditure in municipality i  increases with 
expenditure in similar municipalities. The coefficient of  of below value of municipal i  is 0.529. 
This has a larger influence on fiscal policy decisions on expenditure by municipality i . 
iX
iE
~
iE
~
iE
~
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the differences in expenditure structures 
between ordinary municipalities and extended associations in public LTCI. The main finding is that 
there is indeed a difference in the expenditure structure between ordinary municipalities and extended 
associations. The expenditure structure is also found to be U shaped. In addition, the expenditure of 
extended associations decreases more rapidly than ordinary municipalities. This result shows that 
expenditure of appropriate population size extended associations larger than single municipality. 
Accordingly, existing municipalities are too small to provide local public services such as public LTCI. 
That said, the prefecture, as the municipality’s upper government, is too large because it is impossible to 
provide generous care. In this case, it is necessary for Japanese municipalities to apply broader-based 
government in local public service. 
This paper also examined fiscal policy interdependence in expenditures on LTCI. This revealed 
 12 
municipal expenditure depends on expenditures by municipalities of a similar type. In other words, the 
fact that members of a similar type influence municipal policy decisions indicates the possibility of 
mimic policy decisions. While this is too involved a subject to treat in detail here, we cannot rule out 
entirely the possibility of mimicking. 
Most importantly, while municipal mergers were widely promoted in Japan, some small 
municipalities (such as towns and villages) remain. Our findings show that municipal mergers are not 
the only solution to fiscal reconstruction. Rather, the extended association system is effective in per 
capita expenditure savings. These stand-alone municipalities are then able to improve their fiscal 
condition with the extended association system. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Multitask Extended Associations 
 
Name Num. of municipalities Name Num. of municipalities
Hidaka 3 Kinan 5
Sorachi 6 Kazushi 6
Hiyama 4 Suzuka 3
Ichinoseki 3 Konishi 6
Kuji 6 Kusunoki 3
Hakusanroku 5 NanbuMikaya 4
Sakai 5 Unnan 10
Kitaarupusu 7 Oki 7
Kiso 11 Oku 3
Suwa 6 Suouoshima 4
Anpachigun 4 Miyoshi 8
Ibi 8 Tyugei 5
Motosu 3 Fukuoka 71
Takayama-Ono 9 Sagatyubu 18
Titahokubu 4 Nishisonogi 9
Iga 6 Hokushounanbu 6
Kihoku 3 Hioki 7
 
        Notes: Num. of municipalities is the number of member municipalities in the extended association. 
For example, there are three municipalities in Hidaka. 
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Table 2. Single Task Extended Associations 
 
Name Num. of municipalities Name Num. of municipalities
Ninohe 5 Kumanogawa 3
Moriokahokubu 6 Otashi 3
Honjyo 9 Aki 3
Omagari 14 Izumoshi 7
Niihari 4 Matue 9
Osato 9 Othigun 7
Higashikanbara 4 Hamada 6
Imizu 5 Ashin 5
Nakaniikawa 3 Kamiishi 4
Tonami 12 Karatu 10
Kaminei 6 Kitou 12
Niikawa 4 Tosu 6
Yodakubo 3 Shimabara 17
Tagatananbu 3 Simogotou 6
Watarai 4
 
                 Notes: Num. of municipalities is the number of member municipalities in the extended 
association. For example, there are five municipalities in Ninohe. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics, 2003 
 
 Variables Obs. Mean. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total expenditure (thousands of yen) 2,630 1,886,668 5,650,858 20,910 118,000,000
Office expenditure (thousands of yen) 2,630 68,909 230,404 467 6,698,898
LTCI payments (thousands of yen) 2,630 1,782,518 5,355,100 16,622 111,000,000
Population 2,630 44,224 140,798 219 3,495,117
Pop.over 40 2,630 22,876 69,429 124 1,651,255
Pop.over 65 2,630 1,292 4,114 15 100,063
Number of care insurance payments 2,630 28,694 90,297 196 2,001,295
Group 2,630 1 2 1 71
Total revenue (thousands of yen) 2,630 1,913,814 5,682,864 24,310 118,000,000
Transfer (thousand of yen) 2,630 56,297 193,982 190 5,713,811
Total wage (thousands of yen) 2,630 3,417,030 11,500,000 137,038 324,000,000
Public officer 2,630 362 1,137 15 31,048
Per capita expenditure 2,630 58.11 22.79 16.28 194.37
Per capita office expenditure 2,630 2.29 1.68 0.03 18.85
Per capita LTC payments 2,630 54.38 21.40 14.55 185.19
Per capita wage of public officer 2,630 9,033.51 864.06 4,212.99 13,665.70  
  Notes: Pop. over 40 represent the population of 40 over to total population ratio in municipality. 
Similarly, Pop. over 65.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics: Multitask Extended Associations, 2003 
 
 Variables Obs. Mean. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total expenditure (thousands of yen) 30 6,940,464 12,700,000 563,331 71,300,000
Office expenditure (thousands of yen) 30 197,341 260,358 25,313 1,397,466
LTCI payments (thousands of yen) 30 6,600,357 12,200,000 525,090 68,500,000
Population 30 130,414 203,084 7,822 1,081,236
Pop.over 40 30 70,834 111,081 4,657 605,006
Pop.over 65 30 4,772 8,742 343 49,252
Number of care insurance payments 30 103,659 183,565 7,732 1,032,709
Group 30 8 12 3 71
Total revenue (thousands of yen) 30 7,008,914 12,700,000 576,549 71,500,000
Transfer (thousand of yen) 30 157,598 174,977 17,193 754,835
Total wage (thousands of yen) 30 10,900,000 15,700,000 1,958,806 85,000,000
Public officer 30 1,173 1,595 249 8,769
Per capita expenditure 30 60.04 20.84 27.14 113.73
Per capita office expenditure 30 2.09 1.38 0.61 6.51
Per capita LTC payments 30 56.63 19.40 25.75 107.86
Per capita wage of public officer 30 8,963.22 840.32 7,187.99 11,628.78  
Notes: Pop. over 40 represent the population of 40 over to total population ratio in municipality. 
Similarly, Pop. over 65.  
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Table 5. Summary Statistics: Single Task Extended Associations, 2003 
 
 Variables Obs. Mean. Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total expenditure (thousands of yen) 23 5,423,309 3,748,063 598,566 13,100,000
Office expenditure (thousands of yen) 23 170,889 117,043 37,094 482,001
LTCI payments (thousands of yen) 23 5,097,782 3,476,562 549,724 11,800,000
Population 23 99,123 86,930 6,485 387,776
Pop.over 40 23 55,491 45,283 4,502 199,170
Pop.over 65 23 3,514 2,457 422 8,701
Number of care insurance payments 23 73,264 50,742 8,142 181,222
Group 23 6.52 3.68 3.00 17.00
Total revenue (thousands of yen) 23 5,502,372 3,779,194 607,514 13,100,000
Transfer (thousand of yen) 23 116,459 86,913 6,000 351,829
Total wage (thousands of yen) 23 8,237,594 5,566,734 1,444,193 24,200,000
Public officer 23 903 590 154 2,531
Per capita expenditure 23 67.44 24.49 33.69 122.02
Per capita office expenditure 23 2.49 1.43 0.65 5.72
Per capita LTC payments 23 63.45 23.07 29.19 117.16
Per capita wage of public officer 23 9,066.64 661.94 7,915.92 10,074.96  
 
Notes: Pop. over 40 represent the population of 40 over to total population ratio in municipality. 
Similarly, Pop. over 65.  
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Figure 1. Scatter Diagram of Per Capita Office Expenditure and Population, 2003 
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Table 6. Municipal Organizations by Type, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2001 
 
Cities 
Secondary and Tertiary
Tertiary Over 65% Less than 65% Over 55% Less than 55% Over 50% Less than 50%
Population Type 5 4 3 2 1 0
         ~35,000 0 0-5 (5) 0-4 (9) 0-3 (40) 0-2 (26) 0-1 (32) 0-0 (11)
35,000 ~55,000 I I-5 (7) I-4 (37) I-3 (57) I-2 (37) I-1 (10) I-0 (4)
55,000 ~80,000 II II-5 (33) II-4 (35) II-3 (40) II-2 (24) II-1 (1) II-0 (0)
80,000~130,000 III III-5 (37) III-4 (42) III-3 (25) III-2 (11) III-1 (0) III-0 (0)
130,000~230,000 IV IV-5 (41) IV-4 (25) IV-3 (9) IV-2 (0) IV-1 (1) IV-0 (0)
230,000~430,000 V V-5 (35) V-4 (12) V-3 (7) V-2 (1) V-1 (0) V-0 (0)
430000~ VI VI-5 (15) VI-4 (6) VI-3 (1) VI-2 (0) VI-1 (0) VI-0 (0)
Over 95% Over 85% to less than 95% Less than 85% Industrial structure
 
 
Towns and villages 
Secondary and Tertiary Over 75% to less than 85% Over 65% to less than 75% Less than 80%
Tertiary Over 55% Less than 55% 
Population Type 4 3 2 1 0
~3,500 0 0-4 (57) 0-3 (58) 0-2 (132) 0-1 (89) 0-0  (59)
3,500 ~5,500 I I-4 (32) I-3 (59) I-2 (148) I-1 (93) I-0 (52)
5,500 ~8,000 II II-4 (58) II-3 (108) II-2 (159) II-1 (88) II-0 (32)
8,000 ~13,000 III III-4 (141) III-3 (162) III-2 (166) III-1 (73) III-0 (13)
13,000~18,000 IV IV-4 (87) IV-3 (86) IV-2 (74) IV-1 (28) IV-0 (7)
18,000~23,000 V V-4 (72) V-3 (52) V-2 (23) V-1 (6) V-0 (2)
23,000~28,000 VI VI-4 (49) VI-3 (30) VI-2 (12) VI-1 (0) VI-0 (0)
28,000~35,000 VII VII-4 (51) VII-3 (17) VII-2 (5) VII-1 (1) VII-0 (0)
35,000~ VIII VIII-4 (43) VIII-3 (17) VIII-2 (2) VIII-1 (0) VIII-0 (0)
Over 80%Industrial structure
 
Notes: The number of municipalities is in parentheses. The circled entry in Cities represents Iizuka (III-5). The circled entries in Towns and villages represent the 
Hidaka multitask extended association. Hidaka is composed of the following three towns: Niikappu (II-0), Shizunai (VI-2), and Mitsuishi (I-0). 
(See Section 3.3) 
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Table 7. Some Examples of Municipalities by Type 
 
VI-2 (12)
Muroran Izumisano Minamikabeya Minamiarima Shizunai Shinshinotsu Kawakami Goshoura
Ebetsu Tondabayashi Yuni Yokoshima Makubetsu Shikabe Minamimaki Ogi
Chitose Kawachinagano Nakafurano Tensui Takahata Niki Nishiyoshino Kujyu
Toride Minou Furen Ogata Funehiki Kita Seranishi Kitaura
Kounosu Ashiya Memanbetsu Ono Daigo Uryu Touwa Shiiba
Toda Sanda Koshimizu Azuma Yachiyo Watsusamu Miyakubo Gokase
Asaka Kashihara Kunnetsupu Higashikushira Nasu Kenbuchi Kamiura Satsuma
Fujimi Ikoma Niikappu Onejime Sagara Tomamae Misaki Nagashima
Abiko Hatsukaichi Erimo Isen Haibara Rebun Akehama Kihoku
Kamagaya Iizuka Shihoro Wadomari Minamitachi Tokoro Shirokawa Matsuyama
Yotsukaido Chikushino Hamanaka Gusukube Ishiki Yubetsu Yasuda Sata
Akisima Kasuga Rausu Irabu Setaka Atsuma Geisei Ie
Koganei Onojyo Tatsuko Mitsuishi Towa
Kokubunji Beppu Utatsu Toyokoro Hoshino
Higashikurume Ginowan Shouwa Inagaki Minamikushiyama
Isehara Urasoe Makioka Souma Kitaarima
Ebina Okinawa Samizu Sawauchi Odika
Zama Minabekawa Jyohouji Wakamatsu
Isehara Nakajima Oshika Kaou
Ikeda Fukudomi Hamochi Soyou
III-5 (37)
City
II-0 (32) I-0 (52)
Town and Villege
 
            Note: The number of municipalities is in parentheses. 
            Iizauka belongs to similar type III-5. 
            The Hidaka (M) components (Niikappu, Shizunai, and Mitsuishi) are underlined. 
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Figure 2. Ratio of Office Expenditure and Estimated Expenditure by Type 
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Notes: (M) and (S) are multi and single task extended associations, respectively. 
 
Table 8. Estimation Results for Per Capita LTC Office Expenditure, 2003 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (pop) -2.087*** -2.087*** -2.100*** -2.099***
(0.227) (0.227) (0.230) (0.229)
ln (pop) ∙2 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Pop.over 40/Pop. 2.027*** 2.026*** 2.016*** 2.016***
(0.337) (0.336) (0.334) (0.334)
Pop.over 65/Pop.over 40 19.057*** 19.055*** 18.941*** 18.957***
(5.811) (5.812) (5.836) (5.822)
Rate of LTCI payments -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Rate of transfer 53.317*** 53.343*** 53.754*** 53.757***
(1.920) (1.913) (1.888) (1.886)
Group -0.013*** -0.011** -0.031*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
ln wage 0.167 0.163 0.139 0.142
(0.195) (0.195) (0.193) (0.193)
Municipal Mergers Dummy 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.280*** 0.280***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100)
Extended Association Dummy 0.571*** 21.535**
(0.171) (8.396)
          E.A.(multi) Dummy 0.340 20.375**
(0.244) (7.929)
          E.A.(single) Dummy 0.835*** 20.662***
(0.169) (7.988)
E.A.Dummy∙ln(pop) -4.234*** -4.044***
(1.435) (1.347)
E.A.Dummy∙ln(pop)*2 0.185*** 0.176***
(0.064) (0.060)
E.A.Dumm∙pop.over40/pop 5.101** 4.206**
(2.126) (2.059)
E.A.Dummy∙pop.over65/pop.over40 2.212 4.851
(11.999) (11.135)
E.A.Dummy∙rate of LTCI payments 0.060 0.079*
(0.045) (0.043)
E.A.Dummy∙rate of transfer -37.244*** -35.643***
(11.080) (10.680)
E.A.Dummy∙group 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 8.303*** 8.330*** 8.636*** 8.619***
(2.083) (2.083) (2.102) (2.101)
Observations 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628
R-squared 0.752 0.753 0.756 0.756  
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are 
significant at the 10(∗), 5(∗∗), and 1%(∗∗∗) levels.
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Figure 3. Per Capita Office Expenditure (Estimated) and ln(pop) 
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Table 9. Estimation Results for Fiscal Policy Interdependence, 2003 
 
Variables (1) (2)
ln (pop) -1.523*** -1.523***
(0.227) (0.227)
ln (pop) ∙2 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.010) (0.010)
Pop.over 40/Pop 1.298*** 1.297***
(0.229) (0.229)
Pop.over 65/Pop.over 40 12.287*** 12.293***
(3.821) (3.824)
Rate of LTCI payments -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Rate of transfer 29.554*** 29.584***
(2.322) (2.323)
Group -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
ln wage -0.180 -0.180
(0.144) (0.144)
Municipal Mergers Dummy 0.091 0.091
(0.091) (0.091)
Extended Association Dummy 0.331***
(0.105)
          E.A.(multi) Dummy 0.256*
(0.145)
          E.A.(single) Dummy 0.417***
(0.108)
Lagged similar expenditure 2001 0.138*** 0.138***
(0.030) (0.030)
(Below) Lagged similar expenditure 2001 0.529*** 0.528***
(0.031) (0.031)
Constant 8.921*** 8.924***
(1.777) (1.777)
Observations 2,626 2,626
R-squared 0.854 0.854  
                             Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate variables whose 
coefficients are significant at the 10(∗), 5(∗∗), and 1%(∗∗∗) levels. 
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